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I . ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT ORAL ARGUMENT AND SHOULD ISSUE AN 
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION. 
Ms. I l o t t f i r s t addresses the l a s t thing set forth in the 
Universi ty of Utah's Brief. Although the Rules do not 
contemplate such a thing for inclusion in a br ief , the 
Universi ty s t a t e s tha t i t "does not request ora l argument and 
a published opinion in t h i s mat ter ." Nor do the Rules appear 
to contemplate the statement made by the University tha t 
" [ t ] h e questions ra ised m t h i s appeal are not such tha t oral 
argument or a published opinion are necessary ." Ms. I l o t t 
i s of the view, in any event, tha t the issues ra ised in t h i s 
case warrant oral argument and tha t a published opinion i s 
appropr ia te . For i t i s a remarkable soc ie ta l and legal 
proposi t ion indeed, if the Univers i ty ' s argument tha t t h i s i s 
an " inspect ion" case i s accepted, that an apparently non-
negl igent , money-paying res ident of the State of Utah i s 
checkmated,1 by the laws of the State of Utah, from recovering 
monetary compensation for personal in ju r i e s sustained as a 
1
 As exp la ined in Ms. I l o t t ' s Opening Brief , a t 10-11; 19, every 
governmental p rope r ty i s in spec ted or subjec t to i n s p e c t i o n , t o one degree 
or ano the r . I f the Unive r s i ty can make i t s e l f immune in t h i s case simply 
by c la iming t h i s i s an " i n s p e c t i o n " case , what i s t o s top any governmental 
e n t i t y , in any case involv ing a dangerous cond i t ion (see waivers s e t fo r th 
in Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-8 and - 9 ) , from making i t s e l f immune simply by 
c la iming t h a t i t s only f a i l u r e , i f any, was a f a i l u r e to i n spec t or the 
making of a neg l igen t or inadequate i n s p e c t i o n 9 
result of a dangerous condition that is completely within the 
power of an agency of the State of Utah to correct and render 
non-dangerous. Similarly, if Ms. Ilott's position is correct, 
it would be good for all Utah governmental entities to know 
that they cannot succeed with such an argument, and it would 
be good for trial judges to be made aware of that fact. 
B. THE UNIVERSITY'S PURPORTED MINIMALIST VIEW OF THE DUTY OF 
A PROPERTY OWNER IS INCORRECT AND CONFLICTS WITH PARTS OF 
THE UNIVERSITY'S OWN ANALYSIS. 
In its "Statement of the Issues/7 appearing at pages 1-3 
of its Brief, the University mysteriously casts the issues to 
be decided on this Appeal in declaratory sentences. The first 
of those sentences, set forth as purported Issue No. 1 is: 
The duty of a property owner to exercise reasonable care 
in keeping its premises safe for business invitees is a 
duty to inspect for dangerous conditions. 
As is clear from a review of authorities cited in 
Ms. Ilott's Brief2 (if, indeed, such a review is even 
necessary), the duty of a property owner is much broader than 
that and includes the duty to make premises reasonably safe 
for business invitees or satisfactorily to warn of dangers 
attending the use by business invitees of the owner's 
2
 Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1954) 
(Opening Brief at 18); Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 
2 
property. Indeed, the University has in its Brief (p. 8, 
second paragraph) essentially acknowledged the correctness of 
this proposition. It is self-evident that the University did 
not make the premises safe. And it is completely beyond 
dispute that it gave no warning. 
Also, the University cites Erickson (n.2, supra), in its 
Brief at 6, for the proposition that premises liability can be 
established if the defendant "knew or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known of [the subject] condition, 
and failed to exercise reasonable care to remedy said 
condition ." As the Court will readily observe, there is no 
mention of the word or concept of "inspection" in that 
statement of the law adopted by the University itself. 
Nor is it availing to the University's position that the 
section from the Restatement, Second, of Torts set forth on 
page 6 of the University's Brief mentions, among other things, 
the concept of inspection. The University understandably, 
from an adversarial prospective, continues its campaign, waged 
successfully in the District Court proceedings, to make this 
case something it has never been, to wit: an "inspection" 
case. As explained in her Opening Brief, Ms. Ilott has never 
210, 211-14 (1951) (Opening Brief at 16), Wagoner v Waterslide, Inc , 744 
P 2d 1012, 1013 (Utah App 1987) (Opening Brief at 18, 19) 
3 
so cast this case, and, again, this Court should not be 
tricked into applying the analytical constructs suggested by 
the University. 
C. MS. ILOTT HAS NEVER CONTENDED AND DOES NOT NOW CONTEND 
THAT THE UNIVERSITY FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION OR 
CONDUCTED AN INADEQUATE OR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION. 
Through good lawyering and the citation of cases such as 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah App. 1991) (cited 
at page 7 of its Brief), the University attempts to make a 
duty satisfactorily to inspect the subject bleachers an 
integral part of Ms. Ilott's claim. What this Court needs to 
understand is that Ms. Ilott has never suggested and is not 
now suggesting that the University failed in its inspection 
efforts, with respect to its non-discovering of the particular 
plank that broke, or otherwise. Ms. Ilott herself 
acknowledges that the University's inspection process was, for 
purposes pertinent hereto, satisfactory. For the University 
acquainted itself with the generally dangerous nature of the 
bleachers. Ms. Ilott's contention is that the University's 
response to what it knew, with respect to the general 
condition, was wholly unsatisfactory. It is Ms. Ilott's 
contention that the University should have made the wholesale 
change to metal bleachers (which it did after the occurrence 
of the subject incident) or otherwise physically remedied the 
4 
stadium-wide condition, prior to the time she was injured, 
and/or should have satisfactorily warned paying customers, 
such as Ms. Ilott, of the generally dangerous condition. 
D. THE UNIVERSITY ERRONEOUSLY ATTEMPTS TO FOCUS THE COURT'S 
ATTENTION ON THE DANGEROUS NATURE OF THE SPECIFIC PLANK 
IN QUESTION RATHER THAN ON THE GENERALLY DANGEROUS 
CONDITION OF THE STADIUM BLEACHERS. 
The University acknowledges, at page 8 of its Brief, that 
The duty of the landowner is to either correct a 
dangerous condition or to give adequate notice of the 
same. A landowner has no duty to do either until it 
becomes aware that such a dangerous condition exists. 
The University, at least as a matter of triable fact, did 
not NX correct [the subject] dangerous condition" (i.e., the 
epidemic problem, discussed in Ms. Ilott's Opening Brief at 4-
6, and not contested by the University) of rotted and 
deteriorating planks; and it clearly did not give any notice 
or warning of that condition to customers such as Ms. Ilott. 
The University was, at least as a matter of triable fact, well 
aware of the generally dangerous condition long before the 
occurrence of the subject incident. The University's attempt 
to cram the entire analysis of this case, given these 
realities, into a plank-by-plank analysis, is unfair to 
Ms. Ilott and other members of the public, and makes, in the 
big picture and at least as a matter of triable fact, no 
sense. 
5 
E. THE UNSAFE CONDITION OF THE BLEACHERS CONSTITUTED, AT 
LEAST AS A MATTER OF TRIABLE FACT, A NON-LATENT DEFECT. 
Although the District Court's determination that the 
University was entitled to summary judgment did not reach the 
question of "latent defect" immunity, the University has 
raised that alternative argument in its Brief. 
The University (focusing, again, only on the plank that 
broke under Ms. Ilott's weight) contends, in its effort to 
checkmate Ms. Ilott in her effort to recover damages for her 
personal injuries sustained as a result of the subject 
dangerous condition, that, if neither it nor Ms. Ilott 
discovered the defect in the particular plank, the defect must 
have been "latent." The University curiously suggests that 
this Court should conclude that, because Ms. Ilott, who was 
simply attending a football game and was not charged with any 
duty of making the subject premises safe, did not notice 
anything dangerous about the plank on which she was about to 
step, the subject condition was "latent." It goes without 
saying, of course, that if Ms. Ilott had acknowledged that she 
knew the plank on which she was about to step was dangerous, 
the University would no doubt be arguing that the incident was 
her fault, either entirely or on a 50% or more basis, and 
6 
that, accordingly, Ms. Ilott would not be entitled to recover 
damages. 
It does not follow, as a matter of law or as a matter of 
logic, that if neither the University nor Ms. Ilott knew that 
the particular plank in question was dangerous, the condition 
in question was "latent/7 and that the University is immune 
from liability. The focus should, as stated hereinabove and 
at least as a question of triable fact, not be on the 
particular plank that broke, but on the generally unsafe 
(known to the University and not known to Ms. Ilott) 
deteriorated condition of the wooden bleachers. 
Cases from other jurisdictions have appropriately 
rejected defendants' attempts to cram the focus of the 
"latent" defect analysis on a particular item, in situations 
in which it is more appropriate to look at the general 
condition of the situation in which the item in question is a 
part. In, for example, Schon v. James, 28 So.2d 531, 533 (La. 
App. 1946), the court cogently held, in the course of 
rejecting the defendant's argument that the defective 
condition in question was a "latent" condition, that the focus 
should not be on the detection of a specific leak but on the 
generally deteriorated condition of a water heater. 
7 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the analysis set forth in her Opening Brief and 
in this Brief, and in the interest of public safety and the 
ability of people injured on public property to obtain 
compensation for their injuries, Ms. Ilott urges this Court to 
reverse the District Court's granting of summary judgment and 
to allow this case to proceed to jury trial. 
Lest there be any doubt with respect to what is set forth 
in Point A of the foregoing Argument, Ms. Ilott urges the 
Court to convene oral argument and, ultimately, to issue an 
opinion for publication with respect to the issues raised in 
this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 day of May, 2000. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
TARA L. ISAACSON 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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